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Political Government and Economic Government in J.R. Commons’ Institutional 
Economics 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the major work of the American institutionalist J. R. Commons, 
“Institutional Economics.” In this book, Commons argues that institutions are constantly 
changing due to two conflicting forces: the political government (“sovereignty”) and the 
economic government (the alliance between the pay community and industry). This 
finding sheds some light on the largely unknown origin of the works of several French 
monetary institutionalists. I conclude this article with a discussion of another aspect of 
the theory of institutional reformation in “Institutional Economics,” examining the 
development of French monetary institutionalism. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
John Rogers Commons viewed the money market (“debt market,” in his definition) 
from the perspective of institutional reformation. In his analysis of the money market, 
he dedicated more than 250 of the 921 pages of his major work, “Institutional 
Economics” (IE, henceforth), to this topic (Commons, 1934). In a recent and important 
work, Dutraive and Théret (2013) disclose the substance of IE and discuss it from the 
perspective of French monetary institutionalism. Distinguishing between “political 
sovereignty” and “monetary sovereignty,” Dutraive and Théret (2013) explain the 
evolution of the debt market as a phenomenon driven by the connection and conflict 
between these two types of sovereignty. While French monetary institutionalism 
employs the classifications of political and monetary (or economic) sovereignty, 
Commons used none of these terms. “Political sovereignty” in Dutraive and Théret 
(2013) corresponds to “sovereignty” in IE. The first question I pose in this article 
(which I discuss in the following section) is whether it is possible to identify a word in 
IE that corresponds to “monetary sovereignty” in Dutraive and Théret (2013). 
 
I argue that the political government and its sovereign power correspond to “an 
economic government of bankers” and its “economic power,” in Commons (1934, p. 
895). The term I confront with “economic government” is “political government” 
(Commons, 1934, p. 895). While Dutraive and Théret (2013) derive the comparison 
between political sovereignty and monetary sovereignty from IE, I base the comparison 
directly on the text of IE. 
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In Section 3, I show how the political (federal-level, state-level) government and 
economic government relate to each other in the evolution of political economy. First, I 
address the relationship between sovereignty and the pay community in the evolution of 
political economy (Section 3.1). “A pay community is the concerted action of creditors 
and debtors in setting up a procedure for the release of debts” (Commons, 1934, p. 457); 
in modern capitalism, it is embodied by bankers. I present the evolution of political 
economy as a process in which sovereignty regulates the pay community, seen as a 
private business custom. Sovereignty regulates the pay community following a code of 
public purpose(s). The public purposes presented in IE are three necessary conditions 
for “reasonable” transactions: equal opportunity, fair competition, and equality of 
bargaining power. I recognize this evolution as the progression towards a reasonable 
capitalism. However, IE sees the evolution of political economy from the point of view 
of bankers. In other words, IE explains such evolution as the process whereby bankers 
accumulate economic power using the legal foundations of sovereignty (Section 3.2). 
The discussion of such evolution in IE implies that the economic government, resulting 
from an alliance between the pay community (the bankers) and industry, will end up 
controlling the political government (Commons, 1934, p. 773). 
 
A second question I pose in this article relates to whether it is possible to articulate the 
two perspectives in IE’s theory of institutional reformation. I attempt to discuss the 
relationship between the political and economic government within the framework of 
IE’s theory of institutional reformation (Kitagawa, in press b). On the one hand, the 
political government tries to regulate the collective action of the economic government 
through a code of public purposes. On the other hand, the economic government seeks 
to expand its economic power. We suggest that, based on these two motivations, the 
conflict between these two collective actions is the key determinant of the reformation 
of institutions. Further, applying the conflict between the political and economic 
governments to the framework of institutional reformation, we suggest that not only the 
sovereign (physical) and economic powers play a role in institutional reformation, but 
the ethical power matters as well. In conclusion, to correct the “unreasonable” 
capitalism, where the economic government acquires a dominant position, the strength 
and persistence of the ethical power in both the political government and bottom-up 
movements are of critical importance. 
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2. MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT 
 
In this section, I address two issues: First, I discuss the meaning that French monetary 
institutionalists attach to the expression “sovereign power of money,” (called “economic 
power” in IE). Second, I compare IE’s view that money has “the place of supremacy” 
with the French monetary institutionalists’ “place of sovereignty.” 
 
In IE, Commons defines “sovereignty” as follows: 
 
“Sovereignty is the extraction of violence from private transactions and its 
monopolization by a concern we call the state. But sovereignty has been looked upon as 
an entity as well as a process. As an entity it is personified as The State, and seems to 
exist apart from the people. As a process it is the extraction of the sanction of violence 
from what had been considered to be a private affair, and the specialization of that 
sanction in the hands of a hierarchy of officials guided by working rules and habitual 
assumptions. Sovereignty, thus, is the changing process of authorizing, prohibiting, and 
regulating the use of physical force in human affairs.” (Commons, 1934, p. 684) 
 
The definition of sovereignty in IE is the monopoly of physical power. This is the power 
to define rules (constitution, statute, legal precedents, etc.) and enforcing these rules 
(court decisions, administration, etc.). Money is not related to this definition. Next, I 
examine the discourse of French monetary institutionalists regarding money and 
sovereignty. In the words of Dutraive and Théret (2013): 
 
“The money acquired in IE the full status of institution and becomes a mediation of 
interactions between the state and the market economy. In other words, the money 
enters (the order of) the sovereignty and became an organ influencing the course of its 
evolution and the evolution of capitalism. […] This ‘money as an institution directly 
involved in the genesis of modern sovereignty’ and can be considered a component of 
the government of society, a proper participant of the sovereignty as the judicial power, 
can own sovereignty as the judiciary, but also that, in its contemporary form of credit 
money, it tends to apply for a position of sovereignty for itself, breaking with political 
sovereignty, because of its economic and symbolic power and its own social force.” 
(Dutraive & Théret, 2013, pp. 84, 96) 
 
Aglietta and Orléan (1984) discuss money and sovereignty as follows: 
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“The money is in commercial order the principle that establishes social cohesion; it is 
from the principle that can form and compare the evaluations of private subjects; it is 
from the principle that proceed the payment constraints, the variability of their intensity; 
that allows the integration of commercial activities. Wanting to focus on standards and 
morphogenetic dimension of this process, on the action that implies in defining social 
relationships, we called the process principle of sovereignty. Monetary theory is a 
theory of sovereignty because it defines a specific logic of social relations, especially 
domination and asymmetric effects.” (Aglietta & Orléan 1984, p. 4) 
 
In contrast with Aglietta and Orléan (1984), Aglietta and Orléan (1998) also cover the 
topic of debt, but there is no other essential difference between the two works. In 
Aglietta and Orléan eds. (1998), the authors refer to “sovereign” for something that 
holds the supremacy, and is in the position of mediating social relations. The source of 
power of sovereign money is the fact that each individual is subject to two money-based 
pressures. First, market participants who disagree with the unit of currency are exposed 
to a pressure to leave that particular market. Second, market participants who disagree 
with the rules regulating the use of money also receive pressure to leave the market 
(Sakaguchi, Nakano, & Nakahara, 2012, p. 613). 
 
In IE, a normative restriction is associated with an “economic sanction” or “economic 
power:” 
 
“We need to […] inquire, what are the sanctions by which Knapp’s ‘pay group’ enforces 
upon participants the acceptance and use of that instrument of release. They are not only 
the ‘legal sanctions’ of physical force, to which a purely ‘state theory’ is limited, but 
they are also the moral and economic sanctions of what he designates ‘private 
pay-communities.’ The legal sanctions are ‘extra-legal,’ for they are customary tender or 
customary performance. Take his instance of a commercial bank and its customers: 
What compels the customers to accept, in full payment of debts owing them, the 
demand-debts of a solvent bank evidenced by such a ‘ticket’ as a depositor’s check? 
These bank debts are not legal tender, either by statute law or common law, enforced by 
physical force——they are customary tender. Yet their acceptance by creditors, within 
customary limits, is economically, compulsory, because anyone who wishes to do 
business or to continue in business in that community must accept these checks. If he 
persistently refuses them and always demands legal tender in payment, nobody within 
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that pay-community will enter upon the ordinary business transactions with him. He is 
as effectively compelled to accept the customary tender of ‘good’ bank checks in 
payment of debts owing him as he is compelled to accept legal tender. It is not only a 
matter of convenience with him, nor only a voluntary choice of alternatives, nor only 
the expectation that he in turn as a debtor can also pay his own debts with the same or 
equivalent bank checks, nor the expectation of redemption in legal tender——it is a 
matter of economic compulsion. It is the economic sanctions of competition, ending in 
profit or loss, success or bankruptcy, that enforce acceptance of the customary tender of 
bank checks. So that ultimately nine-tenths of the debt payments in the United States are 
accomplished, not by legal tender, but by customary tender.” (Commons, 1934, pp. 
461–462) 
 
IE argues that, due to this economic power (economic sanction), money represents 
sovereignty. French monetary institutionalists support a similar argument. As discussed 
above, Commons (1934, p. 684) perceives sovereignty as the monopoly of physical 
power, or “the specialization of that sanction in the hands of a hierarchy of officials.” 
With respect to economic power, IE discusses its “entity” and “process,” which 
correspond to the entity monopolizing physical power and the process of specialization 
of that power, respectively. “An economic government of bankers” that, de facto, 
controls certain industries corresponds to the entity of sovereignty, the monopoly of 
physical power, and, according to Chapter XI of IE, to the process in which “the 
alliance of banking and industry” specializes and exerts its economic power (Commons, 
1934, pp. 891, 895; see Section 3). The economic government to which Chapter XI of 
IE refers to is the nexus between the pay community and “big businesses” (Commons, 
1934, p. 888): 
 
“It is not needful for American capitalism to combine all competitors in a single holding 
company. It is only needful to combine the strongest companies and the strategic 
companies. These include the companies that own the natural resources, the companies 
that do the intermediate manufacturing and transportation, the companies that own 
trade-marks, good-will, and patents which furnish access to the patronage of customers, 
and the great bankers who finance the company. This is Integrated Capitalism, or 
Banker Capitalism, because the integration can be financed only by bankers.” 
(Commons, 1934, pp. 895) 
 
“Integrated capitalism” is the economic government of bankers. The economic 
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government is compared to sovereignty, that is, the “political government.” The 
economic government’s “sanctions are not the physical force of the state— they are 
more powerful sanctions of credit, profit, and loss” (Commons, 1934, p. 895). Hence, 
IE considers the economic government superior to the political government. 
 
Table 1 displays some terms used by French monetary institutionalists and the 
corresponding terms in IE. Studying the use of such terms in IE, especially the contrast 
between sovereignty and private pay community, or between political government and 
economic government, we realize how the dynamics of sovereignty and the pay 
community is discussed in IE. 
 
Table 1: Correspondence between the terms of French monetary institutionalism and the 
terms used in IE. 
Terminology of French monetary institutionalism 
 Political sovereignty Monetary sovereignty 
(Economic sovereignty) 
Corresponding terms in IE 
Power Physical power 
(Sovereign power) 
Economic power 
(Economic sanction) 
Entity Political government Economic government 
(the alliance between pay 
community and industry) 
Process The sanction has been 
collected in the hands of a 
hierarchy of officials 
The creation of a nexus, 
supported by bankers, that 
can control a certain 
industry 
 
3. POLITICAL GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT 
 
3.1. Sovereignty and the Evolution of the Pay Community 
 
In IE, money is a mean of payment (“means of release”) for debt and a unit of 
measurement (“unit of validity,” “unit of value”) for the size of debt.i A pay community 
follows rules that consist of business customs and laws. Private and public rules 
represent the legal foundations for money to be both a mean of payment and a unit of 
measurement. Such rules evolved over time. Debt has changed from unnegotiable to 
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negotiable debt, and from “unreleasable” to “releasable” debt (Commons, 1934, pp. 
390). The “negotiability” of debt was established by decisions of the court of equity, 
which assumed the doctrine of assumpsit from established business customs practiced 
by merchants and manufacturers (Chapter VII in Commons, 1924). The court’s decision 
guaranteed the “incorporeal property” created by oral contracts. The amount of 
releasable debt expanded through the abolition of slavery, bankruptcy laws, “the gradual 
abolition of term or life contracts for labor by substituting contracts ‘at will,’” and “the 
prohibition of truck payments and substitution of money payments” in the case of wages 
(Commons, 1934, p. 458). 
 
It should be noted that, in most cases discussed by Commons, the origin of legal 
precedents and statutes were business customs. Public rules are rooted in private rules. 
The legal foundations of the private pay community descend from two kinds of rules: 
private rules (which are generated and changed by the pay community itself) and public 
rules (which are established and amended by the political government, with reference to 
the private rules). The pay community of modern capitalism, descending from both 
private and public rules, is described as a “transactional system of money and value” 
(Commons, 1934, p. 510). When money is an institution, a unified “unit of 
measurement,” the value of debt is created, negotiated, and released. These three steps 
represent a “turnover.” Each turnover is repeated at a certain speed (“velocity” of 
turnover), which varies over time. Commons’ (1934, p. 510) “transactional system of 
money and value” consists of repeated commodity transactions and repeated debt 
transactions. 
 
“Our formula of a turnover of bargaining transactions [that consists of two buyers and 
two sellers] has not hitherto included the banker. Yet all modern transactions require the 
participation of bankers. Even the ‘cash’ payments, usually termed the ‘circulation of 
money,’ consist in drawing cash from the banks instead of transferring demand debts at 
the banks. This cash again ‘flows’ into the banks in payment of debts owed to the banks. 
The banks themselves, if short on this ‘money in circulation,’ call upon the Reserve 
banks for ‘money,’ thus reducing their balances at the Reserve banks. Or, if long on 
circulation, they return their ‘cash’ to Reserve banks in order to pay debts to the Reserve 
bank and thus augment their Reserve balance. 
Hence each of the two buyers and two sellers of a bargaining transaction, who make the 
whole of the debt-payments, must have not only an account at his bank, but also an 
understanding with the banker as to what he may expect towards obtaining the means of 
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payment, which the banker will himself create as a deposit for carrying out transactions. 
Thus our formula for a complete bargaining transaction must have four bankers, one for 
each of the two buyers and two sellers in the transaction. […] One of each possible 
commercial transaction, therefore, arises the possibility of various types of short-time 
commercial debts, whether single name paper, trade acceptances, bankers’ acceptances, 
or otherwise. All have the one fact in common that the sale of a commodity creates a 
business debts which the banker buys by selling to the business man his own deposit 
debt. The business debt lasts from one day to 90 days and the transaction is not closed 
until the debt is paid at the expiration of the time agreed upon. The banker create, in 
exchange, debts ‘past due’ and therefore payable on demand, to the extent of the 
discounted future value of the business debt, and these deposits ae the checking 
accounts against which the customer immediately draws his check for the payment of 
other debts which he has contracted in his purchases of materials and labor. 
Thus each loan transaction creates its own money. There is not a fund of money that 
‘circulates,’ but there is a repetition of the creation, sale, and payment of short-time 
debts to the amount equivalent to the discounted values of the titles of ownership 
alienated. Two succeeding increases in value thus occur, based on forecasts of the prices 
of commodities: the increase in output of use-value of commodities to be added by the 
input of labor; and the increase in value of the discounted debt as it approaches maturity.” 
(Commons, 1934, pp. 510–511) 
 
In Figure 1, I schematically illustrate a bargaining transaction.ii Commodities represent 
one side of the bargaining process, and the other side illustrates the creation of debt. 
Bankers, whose customers are buyers and sellers, are responsible for the creation of 
debt. Money (referred to as debt, in IE) is not introduced in the market exogenously 
from the Federal Reserve System, but endogenously, via the credit requirements of a 
myriad of bargaining transactions in the commodity market. Credit requirements reflect 
a businessperson’s motives for purchases and his/her appetite for investment. Further, 
credit requirements often depend on the profit margins of his/her business. In this way, 
one’s profit margin is the key piece of information associated with a businessperson’s 
decision-making.iii 
 
All participants in the bargaining transaction represented in Figure 1 are involved in 
both the commodity and debt markets. B and B1 in Figure 1 represent one of the 48 
million buyers in the debt system of Figure 2; S and S1 represent one of the 48 million 
sellers. BankerB, BankerB1, BankerS, and BankerS1 represent one of the 9,000 member or 
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non-member banks.” Bankers act concertedly, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
  
Sovereignty (Courts, federal legislature, state legislatures) 
Issue: Are public purposes (equal opportunity, fair competition, and equality of 
bargaining power) accomplished in this transaction? 
Regulation by decisions, legal precedent, statutes 
 BankerB  Economic 
relations 
 BankerB1 
Buyers (bid) ＄100 B Competition 
(Opportunity) 
B1 ＄90 
Economic and moral power   Power   
Sellers (ask) ＄110 S Opportunity 
(Competition) 
S1 ＄120 
 BankerS    BankerS1 
Figure 1: A bargaining transaction involving nine parties. 
Source: Compiled by the author, based on Commons (1927, chapter I, sheet 15) and 
Commons (1928, reel 12, sheet 762). 
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Credits      Transactions     Debits 
12 
Reserve 
Banks 
 Federal Reserve Board  12 
Reserve 
Banks 
 U.S. Treasury  
   
  
Gold 
$ 4,300,000,000 
 
9,000 
Member 
Banks 
9,000 
Member 
Banks 
Member Bank Balances 
$ 2,355,000,000 
Federal Reserve Notes 
$ 1,713,000,000 
Non Member 
Banks 
 
 
 Non Member 
Banks 
 Open Market Holdings 
$ 297,000,000 
 
  
Commodity Markets 
Debt Markets 
48 Million 
Sellers 
Deposits (All Banks) 
$ 54,000,000,000 
48 Million 
Sellers 
 Money in Circulation 
$ 4,746,000,000 
 
 
 
 
Velocity (141 Cities) 
21/2 to 6 times per month 
 
The World 
Foreign Exchange 
The World 
Exports and Imports 
Commodities Gold 
Central Bank Central Bank 
 Balance of Payments  
  Prices    
Figure 2: The Debt Market. Credits and Debits as of June 1929 
Source: Commons (1934, p. 396, Chart 6) 
 
 
How does sovereignty relate to the turnover of bargaining transactions (i.e., the creation, 
negotiation, and release of debt)? 
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“Legal analysis resolve negotiation between participants of a transaction into persuasion 
or coercion, fair or unfair competition, equal or unequal opportunity, reasonable or 
unreasonable price, all of them dominated by scarcity, expectation, and the customary 
and legal rules of the time and place. Then if these conditions of persuasion, fairness, 
equality and reasonableness are not met, or disregarded, the court, representing the 
collectivity, reads into the negotiations, which creates a debt, determined and measured 
by the […] dimensions of the value.” (Commons, 1934, pp. 524–525) 
 
Thus, if the court observes inequality, unfairness, and unreasonableness in a loan 
transaction, it addresses it. Federal and state legislatures complement the court decisions, 
being the legal foundations for the turnover of bargaining transactions. I show two 
examples below. The first is the “small loan law,” which: 
 
“created licensed companies authorized to charge, on sums of $300 or less, a rate of 31/2 
per cent per month, or 42 per cent year, on unpaid balances, and making illegal any rates 
on small loans in excess of that rate. This law was adopted by a number of states. It was 
their standard of the reasonable value of the service rendered by loan companies to 
necessitous small borrowers. Here it is that organized society attempts to offer to the 
necessitous borrower an alternative, which its spokesmen, the legislature, deem 
reasonable. 
Yet, on first impression the states were legalizing an usurious rate of interest. But, 
considering the only alternatives previously available to this class of borrowers who 
were unable to borrow at commercial banks at the usual legal rates of interest, a rate of 
31/2 per cent per month would have been approximately 32 cents. 
This, again, is a special case of dis-opportunity-value, or the value to a person of having 
the opportunity to avoid an alternative higher outgo. Although the rate of 31/2 per cent is 
high and usurious compared with what would be paid to commercial banks by persons 
with good credit acceptable to the banks, yet for the person without credit and in 
necessitous circumstances, the rate is decidedly less than his next worse alternative rate. 
He is better off than he would be under his actual economic circumstances, and, 
although his positive sacrifice is very great indeed at 31/2 per cent per month, it is less 
than it would be at 10 or 20 or 40 per cent per month.” (Commons, 1934, p. 335) 
 
In this example, the small loan law– a state law– restrains the bargaining (economic) 
power of banks, private individuals, and corporations and limits their opportunities to 
achieve the equality of bargaining power, equal opportunities, and fair competition. 
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The second example is the Federal Reserve System, established in 1913. This system 
integrates thousands of banks and takes concerted actions with respect to interest rates 
and supplied amounts of credits.iv The reasons for the creation of this large system 
include the equalization of bankers’ bargaining power and the stabilization of prices and 
employment. 
 
“Manufacturing industries next [to labor organizations, railways, and public utilities] 
came within the theory [of reasonable bargaining power], the issue, in their case, 
culminating in the [1920 U.S. Steel dissolution] cases […]. Then the most 
comprehensive of all industries, the banking industry, was admitted to the process [of 
the historical expansion of the theory of reasonable bargaining power], under the 
Federal Reserve Act which authorized concerted action of eight thousand banks [that 
increase to nine thousand banks in at June 1929], guided by twelve Reserve banks, in 
regulating the prices to be charged for, and the volume to be issued of, bank credit.” 
(Commons, 1934, pp. 345–346) 
 
The operations of the Federal Reserve System reflect the concerted actions of a myriad 
of bankers, buyers, and sellers. Commons envisages the creation of a worldwide system 
of concerted actions of central banks deciding their rates; he refers to this system as the 
“world pay community” (Commons, 1934, p. 590). Inspired by Wicksell’s suggestion 
(Wicksell, 1898), Commons highlights the importance of the world pay community, but 
he is not optimistic about the actual creation of such an international community: 
 
“At this writing, in November 1933, the nations have definitely failed to get together on 
all questions of national and international conflicts of interests, whether economic, 
monetary, or military, and the future is unpredictable.” (Commons, 1934, p. 611) 
 
In summary, Commons perceives the change driven by sovereignty and the pay 
community as the process whereby sovereignty provides the legal foundation to create, 
negotiate, and release debt to the pay community itself. This is a process in which 
sovereignty regulates the pay community, which was created through business customs, 
and is in line with public purposes. We see this evolution as a process towards a 
reasonable capitalism. 
 
3.2. Sovereignty and Formation of the Economic Government 
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In contrast with the process towards the satisfaction of public needs, in Chapter IX of IE, 
Commons outlines the process where bankers, symbolizing the pay community, build an 
economic government through a concentration of economic power. The formation of the 
economic government implies the alliance between bankers and industrial corporations. 
Before discussing such alliance, however, it is necessary to address how sovereignty 
affects corporations. 
 
Sovereignty gave a legal foundation to corporations almost in the same way as in the 
evolution of the pay community. The key concept is “incorporation.” In the early days 
of America, only “those which received special charters by act of legislature” became 
corporations (Commons, 1934, p. 881). “In order to get a charter of incorporation the 
business men had to align themselves with the politicians” (Commons, 1934, p. 881). At 
this stage, those with political power took control, as mediators between political parties 
and capitalists. However, “in order to get rid of political corruption,” state legislatures 
introduced general corporation laws, starting with the state of New York, in 1848. 
Corporations “established a new right of business men— the right of association” 
(Commons, 1934, p. 881). 
 
“Then came a new discovery, thirty years ago, the holding company, invented by the 
corporation lawyers to evade the anti-trust laws, and enacted first by the legislature of 
New Jersey. It was not altogether new, for corporations could always own the stocks and 
bonds of other corporations. Its novelty consisted in creating corporations solely or 
mainly for the purpose of owing and voting the stocks of other corporations. Other 
states competed with New Jersey for this profitable business. 
Almost unlimited powers were granted to the holding companies, and they had all the 
privileges in other states which they had in their own state. The only restraint upon them 
now became the Supreme Court of the United States.” (Commons, 1934, p. 882) 
 
Based on a “per se illegal rule” (any accused, concerted action restricting transactions 
was illegal), the Supreme Court introduced antitrust laws. . In 1911, the Supreme Court 
disbanded two holding companies, Standard Oil and American Tobacco. However, the 
Supreme Court, a judicial sovereignty, had exercised its sovereign power strictly to 
maintain free competition until the 1910s. In the 1920 U.S. Steel dissolution case, the 
Supreme Court applied a new criterion for judgment, the “rule of reason.” This rule 
assumes that public interests must be weighed against the observed and potential 
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disadvantages of competitive restrictions. As a consequence, restrictions towards 
holding companies with considerable economic power were softened. Sovereignty 
provides legal foundations to corporations to exercise their economic power, while 
sanctions against corporations are enforced only when their actions have a negative 
impact on public interests. 
 
Large corporations were forced to depend on bankers to raise large amounts of capital. 
Bankers formed alliances within certain industries, like big manufacturing corporations 
at the top of an industry, attempting to control them through funding and dispatching 
executives. A symbolic case of “the alliance of banking and industry” was the merger of 
Federal Steel (in which J.P. Morgan and E. H. Gary held large proportions of the stock) 
and Carnegie Steel, which was held by A. Carnegie (Commons, 1934, p. 890). U.S. 
Steel was established in 1901, funded by big bankers purchasing the capital of big 
capitalists (Chernow, 1990). U.S. Steel was the first company in American history with 
capital exceeding one billion dollars. Commons discusses the American capitalism of 
big bankers and big manufacturing corporations as follows: 
 
“The United States Steel Company, created by a banker syndicate, and sustained by 
bankers, in some of its branches of manufacture controls less than half of the nation’s 
output. But if a small competitor, in the stress of hard times and lack of orders, ventures 
to cut prices in order to pull customers away, a mere announcement by head of the 
[U.S.] Steel Company that it intends to ‘meet competition’ brings the unruly competitor 
back to the prices set by the dominant corporation. […] This is American Capitalism. It 
is an economic government of bankers more powerful than the political government. Its 
sanctions are not the physical force of the state——they are the more powerful 
sanctions of credit, profit, and loss. The system looks like the old ‘law’ of supply and 
demand and like the economists’ principle of marginal utility. Competition still is free, 
but the sanction has been changed from the economist’s satisfaction of wants to the 
business man’s fear of bankruptcy. The little capitalists […] become in America the 
disciplined followers of Banker Capitalism.” (Commons, 1934, p. 895) 
 
The economic government of bankers, however, means more than the concerted action 
of banking syndicates and big manufacturing companies. As pointed out in the quotation 
above, it means also explicit and implicit codes of conduct rooted in the “fear of 
bankruptcy.” Small capitalists are inevitably involved in concerted actions based on 
these codes. Thus, the alliance between banking and industry exerts its economic power 
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in a different way than a monopoly. With respect to the development of the alliance 
between banking and industry, a perspective that stresses the formation of a great power 
is different from one that stresses the restraint on the pay community via political 
government, to achieve public purposes (discussed in Section 3.1). 
 
We can see a similar description of the Federal Reserve System. In Section 3.1, I discuss 
Commons’ view of a system established to achieve equality of bargaining power— a 
public purpose. Chapters VIII and IX of IE, written in the period between 1927 and 
1929 (Commons 1927; 1928), reflect this view. In his writings after 1929, Commons 
emphasizes that the political government gradually lost control of the economic 
government. 
 
“In the public interest and the need to economize the scattered gold reserves in order to 
furnish a flexible currency, the Congress unites the bulk of the banks in a great Federal 
Reserve System, like similar central banks of the world. The System makes its own 
rules and governs its members and borrowers, much like a trade union. The banking 
system the world over has become the head of the modern system of national and 
international economic government, not only because the banks sought aggrandizement 
for themselves but because dire public necessity required unity of operation in place of 
the older competitive individualism. Great industrial corporations are represented on the 
boards of directors of the twelve bank boards, and the alliance of banking and industry 
is complete. 
Then the [political] government appoints a Federal Reserve Board to supervise this 
stupendous banker’s [economic] government of its own creation, but with low salaries 
and insecurity of tenure in dealing with men of fabulous salaries and the shrewdest of 
ability which modern capitalism enlists in establishing its supremacy.” (Commons, 1934, 
pp. 890–891)  
 
“When the bankers reach the limit of their ability, as in 1932, then the [political] 
government itself organizes a huge reconstruction finance corporation to relieve the 
bankers of liability. Meanwhile central banks controlled by bankers rise to a new 
importance and Banker Capitalism comes into control of industries and nations.” 
(Commons, 1934, p. 773) 
 
Bankers had consolidated a significant economic power in their hands using not only 
industries, but also their physical power— the authority to construct and amend the 
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legal foundations of the political government, which is founded upon law. In this way, it 
is possible to observe the consolidation of an economic power by the economic 
government. This process, as practiced by the economic government, can be seen in 
contrast to the process of monopolization of physical power, as practiced by the political 
government (see Section 2). In IE, Commons does not exemplify the lobbying of 
bankers. However, he views the political government as an entity, as well as the field of 
politics – the internal activities of the political government. “Politics” in IE refers to the 
struggles of interest groups for power within the government. As one of the strongest 
interest groups, bankers are expected to affect the policy-making process. 
 
4. POLITICAL GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC GOVERNMENT IN IE’S 
THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMATION 
 
In the discussion on the origins and evolution of the pay community in Section 3.1 
(Chapters VIII and IX in IE), I address the process whereby sovereignty restrains the 
pay community, in accordance with public purposes. On the other hand, in Section 3.2 
(Chapters X and XI in IE), which covers the relationship between the economic 
government (the alliance between the pay community and industry) and the political 
government (sovereignty), the economic government seizes a great economic power and 
starts to control not only small capitalists, but the political government as well. 
 
Is it possible to integrate the two different perspectives on the evolution of political 
economy? Can sovereignty and the pay community on the one hand, and the political 
and economic governments on the other hand, coexist in a theory of institutional 
reformation, as presented in IE? The fact that the two perspectives were presented in the 
same book and were written by the same author served as an inspiration for this article. 
 
In IE, the theory of institutional reformation integrates two approaches. In the first 
approach, the emphasis is on the participation of actors mainly belonging to lower-level 
institutions and their influence on higher-level institutions. The second approach 
involves the implementation of a collective sanction from certain, higher-level, 
institutions to lower-level institutions. 
 
In the first approach, Commons assumes that citizens try to: (a) capture the collective 
power participating in various organizations (Commons, 1924, pp. 105–6); (b) change 
the working rules exercising the collective power. In IE, Commons argues that citizens 
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establish a higher institution– a private “rationing transaction”– through concerted 
actions. Examples of rationing transactions are the establishment of agreements between 
corporations, employer associations, or trade unions (Commons, 1934, p. 54, 70). 
Interest groups build such institutions volitionally, or they are constituted by orders of 
state and federal commissions. The latter represents a rationing transaction with both 
private and public characteristics; the Federal Reserve Board is one example. In the 
process of instituting such working rules, the coordination of economic, political, and 
ethical principles is necessary. Direct participation is not the only way to affect higher 
institutions; there are two methods available to citizens. First, by launching a legal 
action, citizens turn to a supreme institution with proper jurisdiction to justify their 
claim, which is rooted in private organizations, by ethical principles. Second, the 
citizens’ collective opinion (public opinion) affects the judges’ “habitual assumptions,” 
or code of conduct, because habitual assumptions consist not only of judicial precedents, 
but of public opinion and social customs as well. Based on the clarifications established 
in IE, judges’ habitual assumptions are driven by different principles; for example, 
“economic assumption” refers to scarcity and efficiency, while “ethical assumption” 
reflects universalistic ethical principles (i.e., security, freedom, equality, and fairness; 
Commons, 1934, p. 698). 
 
In the second approach for exercising the collective sanction and inducement from 
certain upper institution to lower institutions, the judicial branch weighs and evaluates 
various aspects of a case, in accordance with the habitual assumptions. Then, the 
judicial branch takes a decision about the case, such as its legality and whether it 
violates the Constitution. As a result, one institution (custom) is selected from 
competing institutions in the case. This decision should conform with various (ethical) 
principles that differ from standard economic principles. In shifting our attention from 
the judicial branch to the legislature, we see that legislatures concede part of their 
sovereign power to private going concerns through the arrangement of a commission 
(Kitagawa, in press a). In doing so, legislatures allow private going concerns to 
contribute to social governance. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the two approaches of institutional reformation. We observe a cyclic 
structure of participations, projections, coercions, and inducements. Economic, political, 
and ethical principles are coordinated and translated into working rules. In pursuit of the 
“reasonableness” of political economy, the three conditions of a transaction – equal 
opportunity, fair competition, and equality of bargaining power – need to be met. 
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Figure 3: The Relations between Political and Economic Government 
The colored parts denote the fields of political government. 
The parts outlined by a dotted-lines denote fields of economic government. 
Solid arrows indicate that an organization self-servingly and artificially selects an 
institution within its jurisdiction. If the organization is a judicial branch (especially the 
federal Supreme Court), it selects the institution artificially, conforming to certain 
public purposes (ethical principles). 
Dashed arrows reflect the fact that a citizen or an organization affects the rule-making 
process of the upper organization to seize collective power for their own benefit. 
Economic, political, and ethical principles are coordinated and translated into working 
rules through the participation in an upper organization and by affecting the rule-making 
process. 
Source: Compiled by the author, based on Kitagawa (in press b). 
Enabling 
Legality/illegality or constitutional/unconstitutional 
Selection of institutions conforming to ethical principles 
Coordination of economic, political, and 
ethical principles through negotiations 
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IE does not address the kind of rationing transaction that the Federal Reserve System 
represents. For example, if the system is defined as a bargaining process between 
conflicting interest groups, it is classified as “collective bargaining.” If the system is 
defined as a dictatorship by an interest group, it is a “cooperation.” The five members of 
the Federal Reserve Board are appointed by the federal government. Each board of the 
twelve federal reserve banks consists of nine members, six of which are selected by 
member banks, and three of which are appointed by the Federal Reserve Board from an 
agricultural, industrial, and commercial (non-banking) institution. With respect to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, there is evidence that Wall Street takes control of 
the bank’s personnel affairs (Nishikawa & Matsui, 1989, p. 150). Considering the 
personnel system, the Federal Reserve System most accurately represents a cooperation 
of bankers constrained by a public purpose—the stabilization of prices and 
employment. 
 
Institutional reformation is driven by both the political and economic government. The 
political government seeks to rebuild institutions to achieve consistency with public 
purposes. A judicial branch selects the best action, custom, or working rule for its object 
from the actions of legislatures, administrative bodies, economic governments, other 
going concerns, and citizens. The legislatures and administrative bodies also seek to 
build institutions consistent with the principles of equal opportunity, fair competition, 
and equality of bargaining power, as well as with the stabilization of prices and 
employment. Furthermore, these bodies tend to approve private institutions that can 
adopt these roles. In contrast, bankers and their industrial capitalist allies seek to 
enhance their economic power and enlarge their jurisdiction, using the legal foundations 
of the political government. Figure 3 does not capture this, but these entities participate 
in the internal activities of political governments (politics, using the terminology of IE). 
In particular, they behave in a dynamic way, by lobbying and sending personnel into the 
legislatures and administrative bodies themselves. 
 
IE sees institutional reformation as a constant change driven by two moving forces that 
are in constant conflict: the political and economic governments. In Section 3, I 
discussed two perspectives. One of these perspectives highlights that the reasonableness 
of capitalism is rooted in sovereignty and tin he coordinated action of thousands of 
bankers. The other perspective indicates that bankers increase their economic power 
through coordination with the political government. The theory of institutional 
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reformation brings the two perspectives together and identifies two moving forces, one 
towards the public purpose and the other deviating from it. Institutional reformation is 
constant and everlasting, since the two conflicting forces are constantly in motion. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this article is to draw from IE to show that institutions are constantly 
changing in response to two conflicting moving driving forces, the political government 
and the economic government. This finding not only sheds light on the origins of the 
debate in the works of Aglietta, Orléan, Théret, and others, but also facilitates the 
understanding of the development of French monetary institutionalism. 
 
In particular, IE recognizes that institutions go through a process of constant 
reformation, reflecting the perpetual conflict between political, economic, and ethical 
principles (Kitagawa, in press a; in press b). Ethical principles may constitute a new 
order that better suits the standards of justice, equality, and fairness (Commons, 1934, 
pp. 766, 789). Ethical power is easy to underestimate. However, through public opinion, 
the labor movement, mass movements, or influencing the impressions of judges 
(through public opinion and social movements), ethical powers can exert pressure on 
the economic government to act progressively, and on the political government to 
reform institutions. 
 
In Chapter XI of the IE, Commons argues that the economic power of the economic 
government may be difficult for the political government to curb. The banking and 
securities industries were criticized by politicians and societies, as they were considered 
a culprit in the Great Depression. This strong pressure for reform tolerated even radical 
experimental policies aimed at overcoming the depression. The severe pressure for 
reform triggered a strict regulation of the financial sector and the collective 
administration of interest-rates system. If we consider this case through IE’s theoretical 
lens of institutional reformation, we find that the problematic nature of financial 
institutions is not only a consequence of the battle between the political government and 
the economic government, but it also reflects the strength of the collective, bottom-up 
ethical power, and suggests how long this power may last. This is an attractive feature 
of IE’s theory of institutional reformation; it is not entirely focused on the 
political/economic government dichotomy, and it provides an interesting starting point 
for future research. 
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i The unit of validity correlates the transaction of goods with creation of debt. Under a certain unit of 
validity, a price in a commodity market decides the size of debt created in the debt market. In other words, 
the unit of validity correlates the commodity market with the debt market. 
ii As shown in Commons (1934, p. 242), sovereignty is the underlying “fifth party” of each bargaining 
transaction. 
iii According to Commons (1934, pp. 560–590), large swings in corporations’ narrow profit margins 
cause instability in modern capitalism. 
iv The approach of the Federal Reserve Board is to control the discount rate and the reserve ratio 
(Commons, 1934, p. 610). 
